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Chapter 11

Organizational Culture, Performance,
and Competitive Advantage:
What Next?
Bianca Jochimsen and
Nancy K. Napier

For over 20 years, beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the topic
of organizational culture has been a key area of interest for managers and
scholars worldwide. 1 Much of the literature has focused on defining the
term "organizational culture," 2 and its relationship to an organization's
performance3 and competitive advantage. 4 In particular, research has examined its importance, its links with other variables that may influence
performance, and how managers can use corporate culture to create and
build successful organizations. In this chapter, we present an overview of
selected past research on organizational culture and how it is viewed as a
contributor to performance and competitive advantage. We also identify
selected areas where existing research has not been fully pursued, for example, how to sustain culture over time, and offer observations on promising directions for future research. Building upon these observations, we
offer a simple framework that categorizes ways that organizational culture
and performance or competitive advantage may be related and that may
suggest new areas for research. In this discussion, we seek to contribute
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to management's comprehension and awareness of organizational culture
as a source of competitive advantage, while acknowledging that links between culture and advantage may sometimes appear to be loose.
WHAT IS ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE?

During the last few decades of research on organizational culture, one
avenue of inquiry has been the development of a concrete definition of organizational culture, its characteristics, and its development and application in organizations. As might be expected, many different definitions of
culture and its influence in an organizational environment have emerged. 5
Specifically, organizational culture has been defined as "a complex set of
values, beliefs, assumptions and symbols that define the way in which a
firm conducts its business," 6 "a multidimensional control system to measure behaviors," 7 and "a pattern of shared and stable beliefs which develop within an organization over time." 8 These definitions imply that an
organization's culture is a unique phenomenon with multiple layers, and
can help frame an organization in specific ways. Although initially looking at culture as a "set of shared meanings," scholars subsequently began
to understand it had multiple levels. Schein discussed three levels of organizational culture: artifacts and creations, values, and basic assumptions. 9
Although the three levels have specific characteristics that make them visible (e.g., technology) or invisible (e.g., assumptions and values) to organizational members or outsiders, all three levels need to be shared by
members to create an organizational culture. Schein's initial model was
modified by other scholars such as Hatch, who added another key level,
symbols. 10 Fiol further delineated culture as an unobservable (culture,
norms) system of meaning.11 These changes and additions over time are
important as they further develop the ideas and models underlying culture, making them more adaptable and suggesting how the various levels of culture are linked. For example, the establishment of culture can be
viewed as manifesting, realizing, symbolizing, and interpreting the four
levels of artifacts/ creations, basic assumptions, values, and symbols. 12
These four factors could be set within an organization in a proactive or
a reactive way. In other words, management could set and reinforce the
key factors or the factors could develop on their own, almost organically,
with little direct guidance from management. Regardless of how the elements come into play, only when they become "recognizable values" can
they be internalized by members and become part of the organization's
foundation.
Other early research focused on external adaptation or ways to define and describe the types of organizational governance reflected in culture. Based on their observations of Japanese firms, Wilkins and Ouchi
characterized culture in terms of clans, bureaucracies, or markets. 13 They
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argued that the clan culture, which they considered most likely to be associated with high levels of organizational performance, demonstrates
goal congruence, shared social knowledge through a long history, collective member interaction, and high loyalty to the organization. In contrast,
bureaucracy cultures are the simplest form of organizational governance
and operate merely through a "sharing of certain social understandings."
They described market cultures as representing a more advanced form
of corporate governance since members share a more specific common
understanding about the organization, such as competition, prices, and
ideas. Other scholars have argued that organizational culture is an important factor in governing how members of an organization interact with
each other within and outside of the organization, and that those interactions and behaviors result in the organization's identity. 14
Culture has long been considered to be a variable that is a key to establishing a competitive advantage, 15 and intuitively, this would suggest
that it could have an influence on organizational performance. 16 However,
research is inconclusive on the questions of if and how management can
actively influence the development and implementation of culture to improve the overall economic and financial performance of the organization.17 A deeper understanding how culture develops is thus critical in
determining whether and how it may relate to performance and competitive advantage.
DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Just as there are many different definitions of corporate culture, the research literature offers different processes that organizations have used in
the development of culture. For instance, Wilkins and Ouchi argued that
four factors (goal congruence, shared social knowledge, collective member
interaction, absence of institutional alternatives) influenced the development of clan cultures and contributed to the formation of a common "social understanding" within an organization that would be passed along to
future employees. Conversely, an organization with high employee turnover or that lacked stable membership or a shared corporate history, may
be unable to sustain a social understanding over time. Other scholars have
identified internal factors that contribute to the development of culture.
O'Reilly described the development as a process with four mechanisms
that ultimately lead to employee commitment and an organizationalculture.18 First, an organization that asks for and requires participation from
its employees will involve them and make them feel valued. Additionally, management must take symbolic actions to support the development
of a strong organizational culture. Such "clear, visible actions" include,
for example, modeling the values that are important (e.g., integrity, transparency, respect for others), and in tum spread and reinforce the cultural
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values within the organization. Third, information shared within the organization (as well as outside the organization), whether it is from employees or from management, needs to be consistent, thereby reducing
the potential for contradiction or ambiguity. Finally, a comprehensive reward system needs to focus on the right mix of money, recognition, and
approval to keep employees motivated.
Wilkins and Ouchi and O'Reilly presented two examples of the ways
in which scholars view the development and implementation of culture.
Whereas Wilkins and Ouchi described more basic influences based mostly
on their definition of the "clan culture," O'Reilly focused in more depth
on internal factors such as management and communication, rewards,
and employee beliefs and attitudes. Other scholars have also identified
a firm's history and heritage as important19 and have pointed out that a
shared mindset is crucial in developing the organizational culture. 20 Additionally, management practices can have an important influence on culture
development and sustainability. Although management's beliefs, values,
and propositions are essential,21 these need to be consistent and encourage
leadership at all levels of the organization. 22 Only if employees are empowered will organizational norms and values be shared within the organization, and in communication with people outside the organization. The
empowerment of employees is particularly important since management
needs to ensure that they are not the only ones spreading and reinforcing
the organizational culture but that employees also exhibit and convey the
"shared set of practices and beliefs." 23 Human resource practices thus also
need to support the spread of culture within an organization. 24 During the
hiring process, for example, the opportunity exists not only for applicants
to learn about the hiring organization's culture and to decide whether it is
consistent with their values and needs but for the interviewer to make the
same assessment of the candidate. By exhibiting and spreading the culture
at different organizational levels, a shared mindset grows, which further
cements culture development. Management must, however, demonstrate
a capacity for change within the organization to leave room for modification of the culture and to ensure it is aligned with the business mission
and strategy.
WHAT MAKES STRONG ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES?

Whenever scholars discuss links between organizational culture and financial performance or competitive advantage, the notion of "strong cultures" emerges. Though the relationship between culture and performance
has been analyzed and interpreted in different ways, 25 a strong organizational culture has often been considered to be related to improvements in
performance26 and organizational effectiveness. 27 Whereas some scholars
argue that a strong culture is "predictive of short-term future company
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performance,"28 others link it to overall growth rather than to profitability29 or long-term performance. 30 Strong culture has also been associated
with the demise of companies and entire industries. 31 Some have argued
that organizational culture could be a "driving force behind continued
success in American businesses,"32 extending the influence of culture beyond individual firms to an industry context. Much of the research findings come from an era (1980-1990s) when Japanese firms were dominant
(and hence a lot of research hailed their approaches to culture) and U.S.
firms were becoming stronger.33 Since then, however, the performance of
Japanese firms has fallen. Does this perhaps signal a different relationship
between performance and culture?
Since strong cultures were traditionally seen as influencing organizational performance, the concept of strong culture is relevant to any discussion about culture. So what are the characteristics of a strong culture
and how has it been defined by scholars? Just as there are a variety of
definitions for organizational culture, scholars have proposed different
definitions of strong cultures and their attributes. Strong culture has been
identified as "stable and more intense,"34 "homogenous,"35 and "coherent."36 They have also been associated with wide consensus, for example,
norms and values that are "widely shared among employees." 37 Furthermore, strong cultures reflect an organization's sense of mission, longterm vision, and adaptability to change. 38 Three key variables have been
identified as being potentially related to the overall strength of a culture:
who accepts the dominant value set, how strongly or deeply these values
are held by employees, and for how long the values have been dominant
within an organization. 39
An example of a strong organizational culture that has led to continued success is that of Southwest Airlines. Southwest has consistently
outperformed its competitors by simultaneously keeping costs low and
customer and employee satisfaction high. This is due largely to its strong
organizational culture. This can be characterized as being informal or relaxed, and is manifested in terms of an enjoyable work environment. For
example, the CEO personally recognizes birthdays, births, and weddings
with cards and notes to make employees feel valued and acknowledged.
The core value underlying Southwest's organizational culture is that employees are the number one priority, and this is the foundation for the airline's service model. The inference is that the strong organizational culture
is positively related to high work performance and that this represents a
competitive advantage the company has been able to maintain.
Research suggests that four conditions are necessary for any asset to
lead to superior and sustainable performance or a competitive advantage.40 To the extent that a strong corporate culture represents an asset,
culture must thus meet these conditions. First, the asset must be valuable,
meaning that it enables an organization to "do things and behave in ways
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to add economic value to the firm." 41 It must, in essence, be measurable
(e.g., in terms of sales or profits margins) or enable a firm to "take advantage of an opportunity" in the environment. 42 Second, it must be rare in
that it has unique characteristics which are "not common" to other firms
in the marketplace. 43 Third, it must be imperfectly imitable by competitors. In other words, whereas many elements of culture may be visible and
appear to be imitable (e.g., allowing dogs in the workplace seems to be an
increasing trend in the last five years according to many practitioner discussions of culture), it is the integration and combination of various factors that make up a culture that make it difficult to replicate. Thus, even if
the first two conditions can be satisfied (e.g., adding economic value and
being rare), they will not lead to sustainable competitive advantage and
superior performance if they are easily imitable and can be copied. A final
condition is that no perfect substitutes for the asset should exist, making it
even more difficult to imitate. 44 Although the natural tendency may be to
notice visible artifacts or surface-level attributes of culture such as office
space and design (e.g., Google's bean bag chairs, IDEO's bicycles hanging from the ceiling), these may reflect but do not define an organization's
culture.
Other factors may support the sustainability of organizational culture
as a competitive advantage, such as geographic location45 or the extent to
which new employees capture and adapt to a culture, thereby ensuring its
continuation over the years even if management changes. 46 From an internal standpoint, consistent values and methods of doing business, and
goal alignment across the organization enhances the likelihood of creating
a competitive advantage, as well as enhancing the visibility of the culture
among those outside the organization. 47 The fact that scholars have voiced
different opinions and created a variety of models concerning the influence of strong culture on competitiveness demonstrates the importance
of the culture concept but also highlights the fact that it is not yet fully
understood.
EXISTING FRAMEWORKS

The review of selected research on organizational culture reveals many
common elements, variables, and implications. In addition to definitions
and descriptions of culture and its links to performance and competitive
advantage, the research provides useful conceptual frameworks and models. Whereas some scholars have developed models of the levels of organizational culture,48others have created models representing necessary
conditions to create a competitive advantage and high performance,49 or
implications of organizational culture. The latter cover a wide array of elements from shared history5° and joint experiences51 to management actions,52 leadership, and human resource practices.53 Common elements,
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however, include defining culture and its key dimensions. 54 Most frameworks tend to focus on internal organizational factors associated with the
building or development of culture, including human resource practices,
top management practices, and the firm's history and experiences. A few
consider external factors and relate these to achieving competitive advantage.ss The models generally suggest that organizations that encourage a
strong culture will tend to have strong performance. The implied mantra
is "do the right thing and good results will be part of the outcome."
Among the most discussed variables in scholarly frameworks are management actions and behaviors and how they are related to organizational
culture and can ultimately lead to strong culture and success. Whereas Fiol
and O'Reilly stress that organizational culture is derived from management behavior patterns, actions, beliefs, propositions and values, Ulrich
and Lake focus on how human resource practices (set up by managers)
may influence internal aspects of organizational culture.s6 They suggest
that leaders who inculcate a shared mindset within the organization and
encourage corresponding human resource practices may promote a capacity for change at all levels of the organization. This moves the discussion of
culture from development to long-term sustainability and management.
Both of these variables, management and human resource practices, are
internal factors related to organizational culture. As described by O'Reilly,
the norms and social realities implemented within the company, through
management and human resources, may relate to a company's strategy
and organizational commitment, which contribute to a sustainable competitive advantage.s 7 In his framework, O'Reilly states that organizational
commitment, comprising compliance, identification, and internalization,
need to be accepted by management and employees to encourage successful performance of a company. The multidimensional culture framework
by Marcoulides and Heck is less specific in stating what influences different factors of organizational culture.s8 They suggest that five interrelated
variables may be associated with organizational performance: organizational structure and purpose/ organizational values, which may influence
task organization, worker attitudes and organizational climate, which in
tum influence performance.
Although most of the frameworks focus on internal factors, Ulrich and
Lake also refer to external variables that may impact the possibility of creating a competitive advantage.s9 They suggest that change and competition are two external factors that could potentially influence how and
when a competitive advantage emerges, implying that the road to competitive advantage is volatile and can be externally influenced. For example, significant recent changes within the mobile phone industry have
knocked Nokia, the early market leader, from its top position. Such shifts
in the competitive market place can delay or speed up the achieving of
competitive advantage by a given organization. The actions of competitors
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represent another factor that can change this timing, and suggests that a
strong internal culture alone does not necessarily lead to a competitive
advantage.
In summary, while the research covers a wide array of elements and
influences on organizational culture, it does not draw consistent or comprehensive connections with performance or the establishment of competitive advantage. Additionally, existing frameworks and models focus on
isolated dimensions of organizational culture rather than on combining
them to build a more complete picture of organizational culture.
WHAT'S MISSING?

The research on organizational culture started in earnest in the 1980s
and blossomed during the 1990s and 2000s. Recent literature, at least from
a scholarly perspective, has been less voluminous. Perhaps the notion of
culture as an influence on organizational performance is now so widely

accepted that there is little need for additional research. Earlier literature
suggests that at least conceptually, scholars assume a positive relationship
between organizational culture (especially if strong) and performance. Indeed, in a recent, albeit informal, survey of participants in an executive
MBA program with more than 300 combined years of managerial experience, none questioned the assumption of culture being critical and useful
as a way to create competitive advantage. Has it become so much a part of
management thinking that we understand all we need to? In an effort to
avoid complacency, should we not periodically ask if something is amiss
or perhaps missing? On (too) many occasions, research based upon a long
history of solid evidence has been questioned, and conclusions sometimes
overturned. From Copernicus quietly questioning the orbit of the earth to
Darwin's challenge of human development to discoveries of new planets
and reclassification of known planets (e.g., Pluto), scientific research has a
tradition of reviewing what may or may not still hold validity.
In management, similar paradigm shifts may be less dramatic, yet questions about assumptions have emerged. Books and ideas from the 1980s
and 1990s caused shifts in thinking but some of their conclusions now
seem outdated. Ouchi's Theory Z, which focused on building employee
consensus and involvement in organizations, offered what seemed at the
time to be views about motivation that took the business world by storm. 60
Several consultant/researcher based books have also shaken long-held
beliefs or helped scholars and managers look at questions in new ways.
Peters and Waterman's In Search of Excellence raised the question of why
some firms appear to perform well over time and others do not. 61 Jim Collins's Good to Great took the question further, comparing firms in similar industries to identify characteristics that seemed to distinguish ones
that had become "great" from those that remained just "good."62 Peter
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Drucker also questioned the ways managers operate and suggested alternate approaches or, at a minimum, that leaders ask different questions. 63
Each posed what seemed to be simple questions and found sometimes
unexpected answers.
Although we would like to be able to follow in the footsteps of some
of these works, we do not presume to be asking or answering fundamental questions of management in this chapter. Our goal is not to challenge
the generally accepted assumption that culture and organizational performance are linked. Rather, our goal is to consider what might be missing in the literature or might be pursued in future research to strengthen
our understanding. As is likely common with any new research, those at
the forefront of early research on culture and performance seemed to be
"certain" of the links they found between the two variables. With more
research, however, scholars often become less definite,64 and as described
earlier, shifts have occurred in characterizing the dimensions of culture
or when it can be a source of advantage. In this section, we look at what
else might be useful to understand about the links among culture, performance, and competitive advantage. We suggest three areas that might be
examined more closely, and raise questions that could be pursued. First,
how does knowledge about links between culture and performance relate to non-Western (North American and European) contexts? What, for
example, does literature based on experience in Asia, Latin America, or
Africa reveal about the role of organizational culture on competitive advantage and performance, and is this the same as in the Western context?
Second, is it possible to have a strong, positive culture, yet poor performance? Conversely, can an organization have high performance yet poor
or negative culture? Under what conditions might these situations occur?
Finally, the literature focuses heavily on the importance of creating strong
culture, but there is less evidence or discussion of how to sustain this over
time. What mechanisms are needed and how might these vary across different types of organizations or sectors?
CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The literature on culture and organizational performance from an international perspective is deep in some areas but less so in others. Moreover, like much of the other literature on culture, it is somewhat dated.
Researchers from France and the United Kingdom have, for example,
found that the connection between culture and growth was stronger than
that between culture and performance. 65 Researchers there also found that
leadership and culture are linked, certain types of leaders encouraging
different types of culture, and certain organizational cultures encouraging
leaders that support those cultures. 66 Lee and Yu examined relationships
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between culture and organizational performance in Singaporean firms,
and found that industry sector may affect the types of cultures that emerge
(e.g., team oriented in hospitals, task oriented in insurance firms, and humanistic oriented in manufacturing firms). 67 In addition, the strength of
the culture was positively related to performance in firms that were able
to adapt to changes in the environment.
Although researchers are urging more work to be done by indigenous scholars within developing or emerging economies, especially regions like Latin America, Africa, or South and Southeast Asia, less is still
known about culture in these parts of the world than in Western Europe
and North America. Further, although culture and performance have been
examined from the perspective of international management and multinational firms, they have received less attention from the perspective of local
firms in emerging economies. Given the growth of emerging economies,
more data that reflect companies from Asia, South Asia, and Latin America
should be available to examine. This opens the possibility of exploring entirely new dimensions of culture. For example, does indigenous culture in
areas such as East and Southeast Asia, where a strong Confucian influence
remains, influence the development of strong organizational cultures, and
how does this relate to performance? Many transition economies that are
moving from planned to market-based systems have now had 20 years of
(generally) open economic conditions. Yet in countries such as Vietnam,
where culture and a history of traditional patterns of behavior dominate
(e.g., hierarchy, being told versus taking initiative, jumping at opportunities regardless of their strategic value), 68 organizational culture may
be hard to establish independently of the existing (strong) local culture.
Without further research, we have no clear sense of the issues and challenges; yet as firms operate globally, greater understanding will be useful.
In contrast to the relative dearth of research coming out of emerging
economies, there is quite a body of work on the impact of mergers/ acquisitions on culture and performance, including some in an international
context. 69 As international mergers and acquisitions have increased in the
last two decades, they have faced challenges of having to blend cultures,
and performance has not always been as hoped for. This should not, however, come as a surprise. A sizeable literature on mergers and acquisitions
suggests that even in domestic acquisitions and mergers, culture plays a
critical role in long-term success, which has traditionally been quite low.7°
According to a survey of 200 top European executives, compatibility and
"ability to integrate the new company" was the most important success
factor, even more important than financial performance. 71
One of the most studied failures in terms of cultures not merging was the
Daimler-Chrysler merger (which was revealed to be more an acquisition
of Chrysler, despite the public relations campaign to the contrary). Within
one year of the 1998 "merger," only one-third of the Chrysler executives

Organizational Culture, Performance, and Competitive Advantage

243

remained. Within two years, all the top U.S. executives had left, retired, or
were fired, and board size fell from 17to13, of which 8 were Germans and
only 5 were from the United States. Ultimately, Daimler sold Chrysler to
Cerberus Capital in 2007. A major reason for the failure according to both
scholars and executives who were willing to comment on it was that the
organizational cultures of the German Daimler and American Chrysler
were like oil and water, completely incompatible and unable to mesh. Like
many other such deals, cultural compatibility is critical but was (and continues to be) explored too lightly during the due diligence phase. 72 This
case serves to illustrate the need for greater investigation into the role that
culture plays (or does not play) in supporting performance and competitive advantage in an international context.
MISMATCHES BETWEEN CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE

As discussed earlier, the research suggests that strong culture is linked
to high performance. But can organizations perform well when they do
not have what management scholars might consider to be a strong or positive culture, or conversely, can an organization have a strong culture yet
encounter employee turnover or poor performance? Under what conditions might these situations occur? One study did reveal that this is possible, and the one variable that seemed to help explain the difference was
whether firms had cultures that were appropriate for their industry sectors
and environments. 73 Beyond that, we have little clear evidence or indication of the conditions under which these counterintuitive outcomes may
occur, whether it occurs in certain sectors, during certain points within
economic cycles, or in periods of political or technological instability or
other environmental states. Yet, it appears that such situations do occur, as
we discuss briefly in the following two examples.
High Performance, Unclear Culture

At a recent meeting of eight CEOs from a variety of industry sectors including sports, software, the arts, and government, one said that culture
is so important for his firm that "if you look away for just a moment, it
can slip from your fingers." The others nodded in agreement and shared
stories about how they focused daily on making sure the message of culture was clear within their organizations. But what if it is not viewed as
being so critical? Can an organization with an unclear or weak culture
perform well? What if top management seems somewhat oblivious about
the role of culture and its importance? During the financial crisis of 20072009, several organizations experienced major declines in performance.
Discussion was rampant about whether the risk-taking cultures of investment banks led in part to the crisis, as described, for example, in Too Big to
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Fail.74 One bank that has received much attention over the years is Gold-

man Sachs. As far back as 1999, the book Long-Term Greedy characterized
some Goldman bankers in less than positive terms. 75 Even during the crisis, however, the bank performed well compared to many of its peers. In a
2010 Charlie Rose show interview, Goldman's CEO Lloyd Blankfein was
asked what he thought had led to the behaviors that caused risky investments and decisions, where the callousness" in the e-mails read before
a Congressional committee stemmed from, and whether it was a "single
individual" or if there was a culture of "callousness." Blankfein waffled,
almost as though the idea of culture had not been something he had considered or focused on as a CEO, responding,
/1

we have to be thoughtful about that [the culture] ... I can't at this
point ... I can't exclude [the culture] ... there are 35,000 people at
the firm .. .
When asked what does contribute to Goldman's performance. Blankfein' s response was that
we recruit and hire the best people and we retain them ... because
we get people who are really interested in doing something that they
think is good for the public .... We get a kind of person who wants
to be influential ... the people would like to do well for themselves
but at the height of their careers go into public service.
So just how important is a strong culture to performance? Other than
anecdotal evidence, we have little clear information about the extent to
which culture contributes to high performance or competitive advantage.
Strong Culture but Potential Turnover

One of the best-performing organizations in the United States, which
has over the last five years worked to build a culture of innovation, problem-solving mindset, accountability, and responsibility, has long attracted
excellent people. For entry-level positions, it consistently receives 100 applications per job opening. One middle manager at a different organization reported that seeing the CEO go on television five years ago to admit
that the organization had made a mistake was a trigger point for him.
That a senior manager would publicly apologize said to him that this
was a place with a culture of "doing things right." He decided to leave
his existing employer and take a lower-level position at the organization in question just to be able to join an organization with a better culture. Since he switched organizations five years ago, he has moved back
up the ranks and continues to believe it was the best career decision he
ever made.
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When the CEO took over just five years ago, he realized the organization had what he called "the cancer of complacency." It was a good organization and had been well run for 20 years by his predecessor; thus when
a crisis hit, the assumption was that one employee who did not follow policy was the cause for the mistake and should be fired. The CEO, however,
began looking in more depth and concluded that the culture needed to
change to one where the "good enough" attitude was unacceptable. Over
an 18-month period, the unit's supervisors developed three key pillars
that were a key to building and maintaining high performance and that
became the foundation for a culture of constant improvement over the
next several years. They included, for example, being sure that staff members were considered first in important decisions, and that the concerns of
the broader community in which the organization operated were also considered in the decision-making process. The culture has helped spread a
reputation among potential applicants as well as customers that this government agency is becoming the "agency of choice" when people need its
services. It has introduced several innovations that none of its peer institutions have adopted, saving several hundred thousand dollars annually.
Yet even this organization, with quantifiable benefits stemming from
an innovative culture and widely acknowledged positive and supportive
culture, found itself stymied within the last year. Circumstances beyond
its control led to a change in the market area it would cover. A peer organization's members began rumors that lower-level employees with short
tenure would lose their jobs and should jump ship to ensure they had
a job. Further, and especially irritating to senior management, was that
"recruitment" took place during work hours when employees of the two
organizations happened to meet on overlapping work or job sites. The result was that four employees did leave. The stated reason was that pension benefits at the competitor organization were better even though the
culture, which employees would experience every day, was not as strong.
So can culture be a competitive advantage? Anecdotal evidence suggests
that although it can, additional research is needed to better understand its
leverage and its effects and influence.
HOWTO SUSTAIN A CULTURE OVERTIME?

A third area where more research is needed is the sustainability of culture over time. Although existing literature discusses the elements of culture and how to create and build a culture, there is less discussion of how
to sustain a strong culture over time. Leaders of successful organizations
who recognize how organizational culture contributes to performance also
realize how fragile it can be. They also use quite different approaches to
sustaining and strengthening culture, depending upon the members of the
organization and where the organization is in its development. We present two short case studies of organizations that have each demonstrated
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several years of high performance and creativity to illustrate how some organizations seek to sustain culture. One case comes from a university athletic setting, many of whose organizational members are students (young)
and transient (25% turnover, new students each year). The second case is
of an organization founded 30 years ago but that has doubled in size over
a two-year period, making it harder for the founder/CEO (the original
creator of the culture) to touch each person individually.
The Test of Culture

Chris Petersen is the coach of the Boise State University football team.
He has been rated by different organizations as being one of the best
coaches in the United States for three years running, and his team consistently ends the season with a high ranking and increasing attention.
He places great emphasis on the crucial aspect of "system" or culture in
his program, choosing players and coaches largely on whether they are
"OKG's" or "our kinda guy." This means players and coaches who in his
words are "high output, low ego," and understand and are willing to put
in hard work and willing be part of a team. The system or culture focuses
on building integrity, good citizens, and being honest and transparent,
both for the coaching staff and players. His coaches seek recruits who are
"great kids and good football players" and who are also good students (he
claims that members of the football team have among the highest grade
point averages (GPA) of any athletes on campus). The program follows a
"pyramid of success" based upon a legendary basketball coach's ideas 76
and includes basic values and expectations, ways to act, and specific goals
that the team and the program seeks to achieve in any given year (e.g.,
achieving a certain number of 3.0 GPAs within the team, winning an
end-of-season "bowl" game). Coaches talk about the culture and values
of the program, model what they mean in their interactions with players,
and seek other ways they can to highlight and reinforce their message.
One of the simplest ways they do this can be seen only behind the scenes,
away from journalists and crowds.
In the typically three- to four-hour-long evening meetings that coaches
hold after practice each day during the fall season, coaches review film
taken during practice and consider what plays they will put into the upcoming game. By the end of the evening meeting to discuss the offense,
only the key coaches remain-the offensive coordinator, assistant coordinator, and Coach Petersen, whose background is in offense. During one
meeting, a graduate assistant (GA) entered the room with a sheet of paper
that required the head coach's review and signature. To an outsider (a
professor) sitting in the room, the assumption was that the paper was a
listing of the GA's hours that the coach had to verify. Instead, the paper
was a test that players would take the next day on a few of the program's
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values. Each week, a test focuses on some aspect of part of the program's
core values, and as the semester progresses, the players have to know and
understand more about these values. Because the values and culture are
so important to the program's success, modeling behavior, instilling integrity in practice sessions and interactions with players, and even having
frequent short tests on the values all help sustain the culture. According
to Coach Petersen, by their third year in the program, players ace the tests
because they are steeped in and know the culture well, and the values become a part of how they operate.
Culture and Subculture

Healthwise is a not-for-profit international provider of online health
information and tools (it is, for example, a content provider for WebMD),
founded over 35 years ago by Don Kemper, who remains CEO. Building
and sustaining a culture focused on respect, inclusiveness, and transparency has been a hallmark of the organization since its beginning. It continues to be crucial to the six-person executive team, which spends at least
two hours a month discussing the organization's culture and how to preserve and nurture it even as the organization changes. Some key elements
of the culture involve a focus on getting the job done, not just "spending
time," which provides flexibility in work hours and location for employees. Transparency of information encourages (perhaps more than some
would like) frequent meetings to ensure that everyone who needs to understands key issues. The culture is constantly discussed within the organization and modeled by managers. When deviations from it emerge,
people take the time to talk about how or whether certain actions enhance
or hurt the culture.
Job applicants (and aspirants who wish to apply for a job someday)
mention its culture as a major attraction. Senior managers say that depending on the position, the organization routinely receives 50-500 applications. In 2010, for example, 120 people applied within 24 hours for a
receptionist. For all jobs, the interview /recruitment process is extensive,
comprehensive, and grueling for both recruiters and applicants. For those
who pass the initial screening, there is a phone interview followed by a
day of in-person interviews with three to four people in the functional
job area. The next step consists of a full day of interviews with 10-12 individuals at all levels and several areas of the organization. If the applicant
makes it through this stage in the process, the final stage involves a case
study or assignment that replicates job tasks. The process itself conveys
much about what the organization's members consider important, and in
particular, the criticality of finding people who fit the organization's culture. The success rate is high, and turnover consists mainly of employees
who retire or move from the area. Rarely do people leave for other reasons.
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Nevertheless, as the organization grew beyond a tipping point of about
150 people, 77 the CEO sensed changes, and the semiannual survey of employees revealed that several mentioned a "decline" in the Healthwise
culture. As Kemper investigated further, he realized that teams were developing their own (sub )cultures and employees were understandably
feeling closer to a "team culture" than to the culture of the organization as
a whole. In response, organization leaders began to urge team managers
to create subcultures that work for the teams, but with an understanding
that these cultures should mesh with the organizational culture but not be
dominated by it. Even more telling is the fact that when the surveys are
done, there are typically several pages of handwritten comments, both
positive and negative. To respond to the comments and to reinforce one
of the key elements of the Healthwise culture, transparency, the executive
team began holding regular "fireside chats" during the lunch period. During these chats, each executive with responsibility for an area that received
a negative comment responded to the comments. Specifically, what would
the organization do if action was possible, or if not, why was change not
possible. Again, the process helps to reinforce values of respect, inclusiveness, and transparency and communicates that any question or issue is
open for discussion. Employees may not always agree with decisions but
they will know why managers make them.
WHERE NEXT?

In this final section of the chapter, we propose ideas for possible research questions based both on existing research and on areas that could
generate new knowledge, particularly the link between culture and performance and the extent to which this link may hold. Although there has
been much research on the relationship between strong culture and high
levels of performance and some on the relationship between poor culture
and low performance, what about the other two combinations? In particular, under what circumstances might an organization have superior performance despite a poor or weak culture, and why might an organization
with a strong culture experience poor performance? Are these situations
characteristic of transitions (to low performance/weak culture or high
performance/strong culture) or are they positions worth examining and
understanding in and of themselves? Starting with the "excellent firms"
research of Peters and Waterman,78 we see evidence of how performance
changes over time. Many of the "excellent companies" with strong (at the
time) cultures no longer exist or can be considered to be exemplars of high
performers. This highlights the challenge of maintaining a strong culture
and raises two important questions: are cycles in the relationship between
culture and performance the norm and does culture shift during the cycle
and if so, what influences the shifts. Potentially more interesting is the
question of whether organizations can move themselves from one position
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to another if so desired. We raise these questions not because they are new
but because so little research has been done on them. An exception was
Kotter and Heskett's book Corporate Culture and Performance, in which they
analyzed and outlined several, at that point timely, examples to support
their hypothesis that there is a positive but weak correlation between corporate culture and performance. 79 Indeed, they argued that the statement
"strong cultures create excellent performance" was questionable.
To better map the possible relationships between culture and performance, we use a 2 x 2 matrix (Figure 11.1) to illustrate the combinations of
performance (high, low) and culture (strong, weak). Each quadrant represents a position that an organization may find itself in. Based on the relationship between culture and performance described earlier we might
expect to find organizations in quadrants 1 and 4. Most literature would
suggest that quadrant 4 represents the most desirable scenario, but for
firms in this quadrant, is culture also a competitive advantage? In contrast, what are the implications for organizations that find themselves in
quadrant 1? And what is the significance of organizations in either of the
other two quadrants?
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Kotter and Heskett noted that at the time of their study (1977-1988)
several companies fell into quadrants 2 and 3. They claimed that there
were several reasons for this. First, high performance in a weak culture
organization may result during and after an unrelated merger or acquisition that improves economic performance but does not generate a "cohesive" organizational culture, at least early in the arrangement. Another
reason is that that high-performing organizations may shift from having a
strong to a weak culture as a result of" arrogance," "bureaucratization," or
"complacency," defined as the failure to adapt to change and the erosion
of the culture fit over time. The Ada County sheriff's office in Boise, Idaho,
provides a recent case of complacency and a weakened culture (quadrant
2), which ultimately allowed the most dangerous inmate in the jail to escape.80 Although many people chalked up the escape to poor security, the
sheriff on the other hand looked into the organization's culture and determined that the breach was more a result of a past culture of "we are good
and there's no reason to change." As a result, he and his senior managers
initiated discussions that reviewed and dramatically changed the culture.
By asking "what is the purpose of this organization," the agency developed three key values: safety of staff, security of the facility, and wellbeing of inmates. Having clarity in the organization's values now drives
the actions and decisions of every member of the organization. In addition,
and in part due to the willingness to question the organization's purpose
and operations, a more innovative climate is emerging, with members of
the organization trying out new ways of doing things within their units
(quadrant 4). As a result, the agency has become one that peers from the
rest of the country look to for new ideas.
If we look to a 30-year-old study as a source of possible research questions today, it is important to ask how well the observations from the study
have held up. How have the cultures and performance of the companies
fared over the last 20 years? Have there been shifts within the matrix? The
results are, perhaps, to be expected. Some of the high-performing organizations or organizations with strong cultures have either disappeared (e.g.,
H.F. Ahmanson) or lost significant market share (e.g., Hewlett-Packard),
or would no longer be considered strong performers today based on culture and financial performance. H.F. Ahmanson was a large savings and
loan association, also known under the name of one of its subsidiaries,
Horne Savings of America. They had the highest corporate culture score
in their category but were classified as having "relatively strong cultures
and relatively weak performance." However, the company was acquired
by Washington Mutual in 1998 and ceased to exist. One reason for their
acquisition might have been that despite their strong culture, the organization was not sustainable, absent strong financial performance. Similarly,
Hewlett-Packard had a high corporate culture score and a decent score
on performance. Over the years, however, the company went through
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significant culture change stemming largely from the leaders' shifting
focus (invention, then focus on the CEO during the Carly Fiorina years,
and severe cost cutting during the Mark Hurd era) and performance declines. Recently, performance has been mixed, with some improvement,
but even more recently it has become obvious what happens as a result of
erratic strategic decisions (and another new CEO).
The questions proposed here highlight the fact that there has not been a
comparable analysis of organizations and their perform~nce and cultural
strength since the early 1990s, making it difficult to use recent examples
to illustrate shifts within the matrix. Although the matrix offers an outline
based on where most of the research on organizational culture has been
conducted, it is not comprehensive enough to serve as a new model. It can,
however, be used as a starting point to analyze important aspects in the research process. Although Kotter and Heskett's corporate examples might
be a little outdated, the results of their study are still relevant today and
can be used as a starting point in developing a new framework on organizational culture. Newer and more up-to-date research on today's top and
low performers can also contribute to updating and developing a theory
of organizational culture and the importance of organizational culture for
success. Research topics follow cycles of being more in or out of fashion;
organizational culture was a major focus for 20+ years and, as mentioned
earlier, may be so ingrained in the managerial thinking that it demands
less attention. But perhaps because of its deep-seated and long-term existence, it makes sense to revisit its role.
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